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Abstract. We prove a general relation between adaptive and non-adap-
tive strategies in the quantum setting, i.e., between strategies where the
adversary can or cannot adaptively base its action on some auxiliary
quantum side information. Our relation holds in a very general setting,
and is applicable as long as we can control the bit-size of the side infor-
mation, or, more generally, its “information content”. Since adaptivity is
notoriously difficult to handle in the analysis of (quantum) cryptographic
protocols, this gives us a very powerful tool: as long as we have enough
control over the side information, it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to
non-adaptive attacks.
We demonstrate the usefulness of this methodology with two examples.
The first is a quantum bit commitment scheme based on 1-bit cut-and-
choose. Since bit commitment implies oblivious transfer (in the quantum
setting), and oblivious transfer is universal for two-party computation,
this implies the universality of 1-bit cut-and-choose, and thus solves the
main open problem of [9]. The second example is a quantum bit commit-
ment scheme proposed in 1993 by Brassard et al. It was originally sug-
gested as an unconditionally secure scheme, back when this was thought
to be possible. We partly restore the scheme by proving it secure in (a
variant of) the bounded quantum storage model.
In both examples, the fact that the adversary holds quantum side in-
formation obstructs a direct analysis of the scheme, and we circumvent
it by analyzing a non-adaptive version, which can be done by means of
known techniques, and applying our main result.
1 Introduction
Adaptive Versus Non-Adaptive Attacks. We consider attacks on cryp-
tographic schemes, and we compare adaptive versus non-adaptive strategies for
the adversary. In our context, a strategy is adaptive if the adversary’s action
can depend on some auxiliary side information, and it is non-adaptive if the
adversary has no access to any such side information. Non-adaptive strategies
are typically much easier to analyze than adaptive ones.
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Adaptive strategies are clearly more powerful than non-adaptive ones, but
this advantage is limited by the amount and quality of the side-information
available to the attacker. In the classical case, this can be made precise by the
following simple argument. If the side information consists of a classical n-bit
string, then adaptivity increases the adversary’s success probability in breaking
the scheme by at most a factor of 2n. Indeed, a particular non-adaptive strategy
is to try to guess the n-bit side information and then apply the best adaptive
strategy. Since the guess will be correct with probability at least 2−n, it follows
that PNAsucc ≥ 2−nPAsucc, and thus PAsucc ≤ 2nPNAsucc, where PAsucc and PNAsucc respec-
tively denote the optimal adaptive and non-adaptive success probabilities for
the adversary to break the scheme. Even though there is an exponential loss,
this is a very powerful relation between adaptive and non-adaptive strategies as
it applies very generally, and it provides a non-trivial bound as long as we can
control the size of the side information, and the non-adaptive success probability
is small enough.
Our Technical Result. In this work, we consider the case where the side
information (and the cryptographic scheme as a whole) may be quantum. A nat-
ural question is whether the same (or a similar) relation holds between adaptive
and non-adaptive quantum strategies. The quantum equivalent to guessing the
side information would be to emulate the n-qubit quantum side information by
the completely mixed state IA2n . Since it always holds that ρAB ≤ 22n IA2n ⊗ρB, we
immediately obtain a similar relation PAsucc ≤ 22nPNAsucc, but with an additional
factor of 2 in the exponent. The bound is tight for certain choices of ρAB, and
thus this additional loss is unavoidable in general; this seems to mostly answer
the above question.
In this work, we show that this is actually not yet the end of the story. Our
main technical result consists of a more refined treatment—and analysis— of
the relation between adaptive and non-adaptive quantum strategies. We show
that in a well-defined and rather general context, we can actually bound PAsucc
as
PAsucc ≤ 2I
acc
max
(B;A)PNAsucc ,
where Iaccmax(B;A) is a new (quantum) information measure that is upper bounded
by the number of qubits of A. As such, we not only recover the classical relation
PAsucc ≤ 2nPNAsucc in the considered context, but we actually improve on it.
In more detail, we consider an abstract “game”, specified by an arbitrary
bipartite quantum state ρAB, of which the adversary Alice and a challenger Bob
hold the respective registers A and B, and by an arbitrary family {Ej}j∈J of
binary-outcome POVMs acting on register B. The game is played as follows:
Alice chooses an index j, communicates it to Bob, and Bob measures his state B
using the POVM Ej = {Ej0, Ej1} specified by Alice. Alice wins the game if Bob’s
measurement outcome is 1. In the adaptive version of the game, Alice can choose
the index j by performing a measurement on A; in the non-adaptive version, she
has to decide upon j without resorting to A. As we will see, this game covers a
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large class of quantum cryptographic schemes, where Bob’s binary measurement
outcome specifies whether Alice succeeded in breaking the scheme.
Our main result shows that in any such game it holds that PAsucc ≤ 2nPNAsucc
where n = H0(A), i.e., the number of qubits of A. Actually, as already mentioned,
we show a more general and stronger bound PAsucc ≤ 2I
acc
max
(B;A)PNAsucc that also
applies if we have no bound on the number of qubits of A, but we have some
control over its “information content” Iaccmax(B;A), which is a new information
measure that we introduce and show to be upper bounded by H0(A).
To give a first indication of the usefulness of our result, we observe that it
easily provides a lower-bound on the quantity, or quality, of entanglement (as
measured by Iaccmax(B;A)) that a dishonest committer needs in order to carry out
the standard attack [18] on a quantum bit commitment scheme. Let Alice be
the committer and Bob the receiver in a bit commitment scheme in which the
opening phase consists of Alice announcing a classical string j and Bob applying
a verification described by POVM {Ejaccept, Ejreject}. In the standard attack, Alice
always commits to 0 while purifying her actions and applies an operation on her
register if she wants to change her commitment to 1. If we let ρAB be the state
of Bob’s register B that corresponds to a commitment to 0, then the probability
that a memoryless Alice successfully changes her commitment to 1 is PNAsucc =
maxj tr(E
j
acceptρAB) where the maximum is over all j that open 1. If Alice holds
a register A entangled with B, our main result implies that Iaccmax(B;A) must be
proportional to − logPNAsucc for Alice to have a constant probability of changing
her commitment.
But the real potential lies in the observation that adaptivity is notoriously
difficult to handle in the analysis of cryptographic protocols, and as such our
result provides a very powerful tool: as long as we have enough control over the
side information, it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to non-adaptive attacks.
Applications. We demonstrate the usefulness of this methodology by proving
the security of two commitment schemes. In both examples, the fact that the
adversary holds quantum side information obstructs a direct analysis of the
scheme, and we circumvent it by analyzing a non-adaptive version and applying
our general result.
One-bit cut-and-choose is universal for two-party computation. As a first ex-
ample, we propose and prove secure a quantum bit commitment scheme that
uses an ideal 1-bit cut-and-choose primitive 1CC (see Fig. 1 in Sect. 4) as a black
box. Since bit commitment (BC) implies oblivious transfer (OT) in the quantum
setting [2,7,20], and oblivious transfer is universal for two-party computation,
this implies the universality of 1CC and thus completes the zero/xor/one law
proposed in [9]. Indeed, it was shown in [9] that in the information-theoretic
quantum setting, every primitive is either trivial (zero), universal (one), or can
be used to implement an XOR— except that there was one missing piece in
their characterization: it excluded 1CC (and any primitive that implies 1CC but
not 2CC). How 1CC fits into the landscape was left as an open problem in [9];
we resolve it here.
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The BCJL bit commitment scheme in (a variant of) the bounded quantum storage
model. As a second application, we consider a general class of non-interactive
commitment schemes and we show that for any such scheme, security against an
adversary with no quantum memory at all implies security in a slightly strength-
ened version of the standard bounded quantum storage model4, with a corre-
sponding loss in the error parameter.5
As a concrete example scheme, we consider the classic BCJL scheme that was
proposed in 1993 by Brassard et al. [6] as a candidate for an unconditionally-
secure scheme—back when this was thought to be possible—but until now
has resisted any rigorous positive security analysis. Our methodology of relating
adaptive to non-adaptive security allows us to prove it secure in (a variant of)
the bounded quantum storage model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Notation
For any string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and any subset t = {t1, . . . tk} ⊆ [n],
we write xt for the substring xt = (xt1 , . . . , xtk) ∈ {0, 1}|t|. The n-bit all-zero
string is denoted as 0n. The Hamming distance between between two strings
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n is defined as d(x, y) = ∑ni=1 xi ⊕ yi. For δ > 0 and x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Bδ(x) denotes the set of all n bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from x.
We denote by lg (·) the logarithm with respect to base 2. It is well known that the
set Bδ(x) contains at most 2nh(δ) strings where h(δ) = −δ lg(δ)−(1−δ) lg(1−δ)
is the binary entropy function.
Ideal cryptographic functionalities (or primitives) are referenced by their
name written in sans-serif font. They are fully described by their input/output
behaviour (see, e.g., functionality 1CC described in Fig. 1 in Sect. 4). Crypto-
graphic protocols have their names written in small capitals with a primitive
name in superscript if the protocol has black-box access to this primitive (e.g.
protocol bc1CC in Sect. 4).
2.2 Quantum States and More
We assume familiarity with the basic concepts of quantum information; we
merely fix notation and terminology here. We label quantum registers by capital
letters A,B etc. and their corresponding Hilbert spaces are respectively denoted
by HA,HB etc. We say that a quantum register A is “empty” if dim(HA) = 1.
The state of a quantum register is specified by a density operator ρ, a positive
semidefinite trace-1 operator. We typically write ρA for the state of A, etc. The
4 Beyond bounding the adversary’s quantum memory, we also restrict its measure-
ments to be projective; this can be justified by the fact that to actually implement
a non-projective measurement, additional quantum memory is needed.
5 We have already shown above how to argue for the standard attack [18] against
quantum bit commitment schemes; taking care of arbitrary attacks is more involved.
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set of density operators for register A is denoted D(HA). We write X ≥ 0 to
express that the operator X is positive semidefinite, and Y ≥ X to express that
Y −X is positive semidefinite.
We measure the distance between two states ρ and σ in terms of their trace
distance D(ρ, σ) := 12‖ρ− σ‖1, where ‖X‖1 := tr(
√
X†X) is the trace norm. We
say that ρ and σ are ǫ-close if D(ρ, σ) ≤ ǫ, and we call them indistinguishable if
their trace distance is negligible (in the security parameter).
The computational (or rectilinear) basis for a single qubit quantum register
is denoted by {|0〉+, |1〉+}, and the diagonal basis by {|0〉×, |1〉×}. Recall that
|0〉× = 1√2 (|0〉+ + |1〉+) and |1〉× = 1√2 (|0〉+ − |1〉+). For any x ∈ {0, 1}n and
θ ∈ {+,×}n, we set |x〉θ :=
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉θi . In the following, we will view and
represent any sequence of diagonal and computational bases by a bit string
θ ∈ {0, 1}n, where θi = 0 represents the computational basis and θi = 1 the
diagonal basis. In other words, for b ∈ {0, 1}, |b〉0 := |b〉+ and |b〉1 := |b〉×. And
for θ, x ∈ {0, 1}n, we define |x〉θ :=
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉θi .
Operations on quantum registers are modeled as completely-positive trace-
preserving (CPTP) maps. To indicate that a CPTP map E takes inputs in A
and outputs to B, we use subscript A→ B. If EA→B is a CPTP map acting on
register A, we slightly abuse notation and write E(ρAC) instead of E ⊗ IC(ρAC)
where IC is the CPTP map that leaves register C unchanged. A measurement
on a quantum register A, producing a measurement outcome X , is a CPTP map
EA→X of the form
E(ρA) =
∑
x∈X
tr (ExρA) |x〉〈x|X ,
where {|x〉} a basis of HX and E = {Ex}x∈X is a POVM, i.e., a collection of
positive semidefinite operators satisfying
∑
x∈X Ex = I.
The spectral norm of an operator X is defined as ‖X‖ := max|u〉 ‖X |u〉‖,
where the maximum is over all normalized vectors |u〉, and an operator is called
an orthogonal projector if X† = X and X2 = X . The following was shown in [8].
Lemma 1. For any two orthogonal projectors X and Y : ‖X+Y ‖ ≤ 1+ ‖XY ‖.
2.3 Entropy and Privacy Amplification
In the following, the two notions of entropy that we will be dealing with are the
min-entropy and the zero-entropy of a quantum register. They are defined as
follows:
Definition 1. The min-entropy of a bipartite quantum state ρAB relative to
register B is the largest number H∞(A|B)ρ such that there exists a σB ∈ D(HB),
2−H∞(A|B)ρ · IA ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB .
The zero-entropy of a state ρA is defined as
H0(A)ρ = lg (rank(ρA)) .
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We write H∞(A|B) and H0(A) when the state of the registers is clear from the
context.
The min-entropy has the following operational interpretation [15]. Let ρXB
be a so-called cq-state, i.e., of the from ρXB =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxB. Then
Pguess(X |B) = 2−H∞(X|B)ρ where Pguess(X |B) is the probability of guessing the
value of the classical random variable X , maximized over all POVMs on B.
Let Gn be a family of hash functions g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with a binary
output. The family Gn is said to be two-universal if for any x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with
x 6= y and G ∈R Gn,
Pr (G(x) = G(y)) ≤ 1
2
.
Privacy amplification against quantum side information, in case of hash func-
tions with a binary-output, can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Privacy amplification [19]). Let Gn be a two-universal family
of hash functions g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with a binary output. Furthermore, let
ρXE =
∑
x∈{0,1}n PX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxE be an arbitrary cq-state, and let
ρY GXE :=
1
|Gn|
∑
g∈Gn
∑
x∈{0,1}n
PX(x)|g(x)〉〈g(x)|Y ⊗ |g〉〈g|G ⊗ |x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρxE
be the state obtained by choosing a random g in Gn, applying g to the value stored
in X, and storing the result in register Y . Then,
D
(
ρY GE ,
IY
2
⊗ ρGE
)
≤ 1
2
· 2− 12 (H∞(X|E)−1) .
3 Main Result
We consider an abstract game between two parties Alice and Bob. The game is
specified by a joint state ρAB, shared between Alice and Bob who hold respective
registers A and B, and by a non-empty finite family E = {Ej}j∈J of binary-
outcome POVMs Ej = {Ej0 , Ej1} acting on B. An execution of the game works
as follows: Alice announces an index j ∈ J to Bob, and Bob measures register
B of the state ρAB using the POVM Ej specified by Alice’s choice of j. Alice
wins the game if the measurement outcome is 1. We distinguish between an
adaptive and a non-adaptive Alice. An adaptive Alice can obtain j by performing
a measurement on her register A of ρAB; on the other hand, an non-adaptive
Alice has to produce j from scratch, i.e., without accessing A. This motivates
the following formal definitions.
Definition 2. Let ρAB be a bipartite quantum state, and let E = {Ej}j∈J be a
non-empty finite family of binary-outcome POVMs Ej = {Ej0, Ej1} acting on B.
Then, we define
Psucc(ρAB,E) := max{Fj}j
∑
j∈J
tr
((
Fj ⊗ Ej1
)
ρAB
)
,
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where the maximum is over all POVMs {Fj}j∈J acting on A. We call
Psucc(ρAB ,E) the adaptive success probability, and we call Psucc(ρB,E) the non-
adaptive success probability, where the latter is naturally understood by consid-
ering an “empty” A, and it equals
Psucc(ρB ,E) = max
j∈J
tr
(
Ej1ρB
)
.
If ρAB and E are clear from the context, we write P
A
succ and P
NA
succ instead of
Psucc(ρAB ,E) and Psucc(ρB,E).
As a matter of fact, for the sake of generality, we consider a setting with
an additional quantum register A′ to which both the adaptive and the non-
adaptive Alice have access to, but, as above only the adaptive Alice has access
to A. In that sense, we will compare an adaptive with a semi-adaptive Alice.
Formally, we will consider a tripartite state ρAA′B and relate Psucc(ρAA′B,E) to
Psucc(ρA′B,E). Obviously, the special case of an “empty” A′ will then provide a
relation between PAsucc and P
NA
succ.
We now introduce a new measure of (quantum) information Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρ,
which will relate the adaptive to the non- or semi-adaptive success probability
in our main theorem. In its unconditional form Iaccmax(B;A)ρ, it is the accessible
version of the max-information Imax(B;A)ρ introduced in [3]; this means that
it is the amount of max-information that can be accessed via measurements on
Alice’s share.
Definition 3. Let ρAA′B be a tripartite quantum state. Then, we define
Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρ as the smallest real number such that, for every measurement
MAA′→X there exists a measurement NA′→X such that
M(ρAA′B) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρN (ρA′B) .
The unconditional version Iaccmax(B;A)ρ is naturally defined by considering A
′ to
be “empty”; the above condition then coincides with
M(ρAB) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A)ρσX ⊗ ρB ,
for some normalized density matrix σX ∈ D(HX), which can be interpreted as
the outcome of a measurement NC→X on an “empty” register.
We are now ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2. Let ρAA′B be a tripartite quantum state, and let E = {Ej}j∈J be
a non-empty finite family of binary-outcome POVMs Ej acting on B. Then, we
have that
Psucc(ρAA′B ,E) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρPsucc(ρA′B,E) .
By considering an “empty” A′, we immediately obtain the following.
Corollary 1. Let ρAB be a bipartite quantum state, and let E = {Ej}j∈J be as
above. Then,
PAsucc ≤ 2I
acc
max
(B;A)ρPNAsucc .
7
Proof (of Theorem 2). Let {Fj}j∈J be an arbitrary POVM acting on AA′, and
let MAA′→J be the corresponding measurement M(σAA′) =
∑
j tr(Fjσ)|j〉〈j|.
We define the map
EJB→C(σJB) :=
∑
j
tr
(
(|j〉〈j| ⊗ Ej1)σJB
)
,
which is completely positive (but not trace-preserving in general). From the
definition of Iaccmax, we know that there exists a measurementNA′→J , i.e., a CPTP
map of the form N (σA′ ) =
∑
j tr(F
′
jσ)|j〉〈j| for a POVM {F ′j}j∈J acting on A′,
such that
M(ρAA′B) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρN (ρA′B) .
Applying E on both sides gives
(E ◦M)(ρAA′B) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρ(E ◦ N )(ρA′B) ,
and expanding both sides using the definitions of E , M and N gives
∑
j
tr
(
(Fj ⊗ Ej1)ρAA′B
)
≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρ
∑
j
tr
(
(F ′j ⊗ Ej1)ρA′B
)
≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρPsucc(ρA′B,E) .
This yields the theorem statement, since the left-hand side equals to
Psucc(ρAA′B,E) when maximized over the choice of the POVM {Fj}j∈J . ⊓⊔
By the following proposition, we see that Corollary 1 implies a direct generaliza-
tion of the classical bound, which ensures that giving access to n bits increases
the success probability by at most 2n, to qubits.
Proposition 1. For any ρAB, we have that I
acc
max(B;A)ρ ≤ H0(A)ρ.
Proof. Let |ψ〉ABR be a purification of ρAB and let MA→X be a measurement
on A. Since |ψ〉 is also a purification of ρA, there exists a linear operator VA¯→BR
from a register A¯ of the same dimension as A into BR such that |ψ〉ABR =
(IA ⊗ V )|Φ〉AA¯, with |Φ〉 =
∑
i |i〉A ⊗ |i〉A¯. Now, first note that
2−H0(A)(M⊗ I)(ΦAA¯) =
∑
x
λx|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ωxA¯ ≤
∑
x
λx|x〉〈x|X ⊗ IA¯ ,
where {λx} is a probability distribution, and each ωxA¯ is normalized because
tr(Φ) = 2H0(A). Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 2H0(A) and conju-
gating by V , we get
(M⊗ I)(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ≤ 2H0(A)
∑
x
λx|x〉〈x| ⊗ V V † .
Using the fact that V V † = ψBR := trA(|ψ〉〈ψ|), this yields
(M⊗ I)(|ψ〉〈ψ|) ≤ 2H0(A)
∑
x
λx|x〉〈x| ⊗ ψBR .
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Tracing out R on both sides and defining σX =
∑
x λx|x〉〈x| then yields
(M⊗ I)(ρAB) ≤ 2H0(A)σX ⊗ ρB ,
which proves the claim. ⊓⊔
One might naively expect that also the conditional version Iaccmax(B;A|A′)ρ is up-
per bounded by H0(A)ρ, implying a corresponding statement for a semi-adaptive
Alice: giving access to n additional qubits increases the success probability by
at most 2n. However, this is not true, as the following example illustrates. Let
register B contain two random classical bits, and let A and A′ be two qubit reg-
isters, containing one of the four Bell states, and which one it is, is determined
by the two classical bits. Alice’s goal is to guess the two bits. Clearly, A′ alone
is useless, and thus a semi-adaptive Alice having access to A′ has a guessing
probability of at most 14 . On the other hand, adaptive Alice can guess them with
certainty by doing a Bell measurement on AA′.
However, Proposition 1 does generalize to the conditional version in case of
a classical A′.
Proposition 2. For any state ρZAB with classical Z:
Iaccmax(B;A|Z)ρ ≤ maxz I
acc
max(B;A)ρz ≤ H0(A)ρ .
An additional property of Iaccmax is that quantum operations that are in ten-
sor product form on registers A and B cannot increase the max-accessible-
information.
Proposition 3. Let EAB→A′B′ be a CPTP map of the form E = EA⊗EB. Then
Iaccmax(B
′;A′)E(ρ) ≤ Iaccmax(B;A)ρ .
The proofs the two previous results can be found in Appendix A.
4 Application 1: 1CC is Universal
4.1 Background
It is a well-known fact that information-theoretically secure two-party computa-
tion is impossible without assumptions. As a result, one of the natural questions
that arises is: what are the minimal assumptions required to achieve it? One way
to attack this question is to try to identify the simplest cryptographic primitives
which, when made available in a black-box way to the two parties, allow them
to perform arbitrary two-party computations. We then say that such a primitive
is “universal”. Perhaps the best known such primitive is one-out-of-two oblivious
transfer (OT), which has been shown to be universal by Kilian [10]. Since then,
the power of various primitives for two-party computation has been studied in
much more detail [11,12,16,14,17,13]. Recently, it has been shown in [16] that
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every non-trivial two-party primitive (i.e. any primitive that cannot be done
from scratch without assumptions) can be used as a black-box to implement one
of four basic primitives: oblivious transfer (OT), bit commitment (BC), an XOR
between Alice’s and Bob’s inputs, or a primitive called cut-and-choose (CC) as
depicted in Fig. 1.
CC
x c ∈ {0, 1}
c w =
{
⊥ if c = 0
x if c = 1.
Fig. 1. The cut-and-choose functionality. The one-bit and two-bit versions of the func-
tionality refer to the length of x. One player chooses x, and the other player chooses
whether he wants to see x or not. The first player then learns the choice that was made.
Interestingly, this picture becomes considerably simpler when we consider
quantum protocols. First, BC can be used to implement OT [2,7,20] and is
therefore universal. Furthermore, as was shown in [9], even a 2-bit cut-and-
choose (2CC) is universal in the quantum setting, giving rise to what they call
a zero/xor/one law: every primitive is either trivial (zero), universal (one), or
can be used to implement an XOR. However, there was one missing piece in
this characterization: it applies to all functionalities except those that are suf-
ficient to implement 1-bit cut-and-choose (1CC), but not 2CC. In this section,
we resolve this issue by showing that 1CC is universal. We do this by presenting
a quantum protocol for bit commitment that uses 1CC as a black box, and we
prove its security using our adaptive to non-adaptive reduction.
4.2 The Protocol
The protocol is given in Fig. 2, where Alice is the committer and Bob the receiver.
The protocol is parameterized by N ∈ N, which acts as security parameter, and
by constants q, τ and r, where q, τ > 0 are small and r < 1 is close to 1.
Intuitively, our bit commitment protocol uses the 1CC primitive to ensure that
the state Alice sends to Bob is close to what it is supposed to be: |0N 〉θ for
some randomly chosen but fixed basis θ. Indeed, the 1CC primitive allows Bob
to sample a small random subset of the qubits and check for correctness on that
subset; if the state looks correct on this subset, we expect that it cannot be too
far off on the unchecked part.
Note that our protocol uses the B92 [1] encoding ({|0〉+, |0〉×}), rather than
the more common BB84 encoding. This allows us to get away with a one-bit cut-
and-choose functionality; with the BB84 encoding, Alice would have to “commit”
to two bits: the basis and the measurement outcome.
We use the quantum sampling framework of Bouman and Fehr [4] to analyze
the checking procedure of the protocol. Actually, we use the adaptive version
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commit1CCN,q,τ,r(b):
1. Alice chooses random θ ∈ {0, 1}N and sends the N qubit state |0N 〉
θ
to Bob.
2. For i = 1 . . . N , do
(a) Alice and Bob invoke an instance of 1CC: Alice inputs the bit θi, and Bob
inputs bit 1 with probability q and bit 0 with probability 1− q.
(b) If Bob’s input was 1, he measures the ith qubit of the state he received
in basis θi and checks that the result is 0. If it is not, he aborts.
Let t ⊂ [N ] the set of positions that Bob checked, t¯ = [N ] \ t, and n = |t¯|.
3. Alice aborts the protocol if Bob checked more than 2qN positions.6
4. Bob chooses a generator matrix G of a [n, k, d]-code with rate k/n ≥ r and
d/n ≥ τ , and he sends G to Alice, who checks that indeed k/n ≥ r.
5. Alice picks a random member g ∈ Gn from a family Gn of two-universal hash
functions, and she computes the syndrome s of θt¯ for the linear code. Then,
she sends g, s and w = g(θt¯)⊕ b to Bob.
reveal1CC:
1. Alice sends θt¯ and b to Bob.
2. Bob checks that he obtains 0 by measuring the ith qubit in basis θi for all
i ∈ t¯. He checks that θt¯ has syndrome s, and that g(θt¯)⊕w = b. If one of the
above checks failed, he aborts.
Fig. 2. Bit commitment protocol bc1CC based on the 1-bit cut-and-choose primitive.
of [9], which deals with an Alice that can decide on the next basis adaptively
depending on what Bob has asked to see so far. On the other hand, to deal with
Bob choosing his sample subset adaptively depending on what he has seen so
far, we require the sample subset to be rather small, so that we can then apply
union bound over all possible choices.
4.3 Security Proofs
We use the standard notion of hiding for a (quantum) bit commitment scheme.
Definition 4 (Hiding). A bit-commitment scheme is ǫ-hiding if, for any dis-
honest receiver Bob, his state ρ0 corresponding to a commitment to b = 0 and
his state ρ1 corresponding to a commitment to b = 1 satisfy D(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ ǫ.
Since the proof that our protocol is hiding uses a standard approach, we only
briefly sketch it.
6 If Bob is honest, this eventuality only occurs with probability less than 2 exp(−2q2N)
according to Hoeffding’s inequality.
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Theorem 3. Protocol commit1CCN,q,τ,r is 2
− 1
2
N(lg(1/γ)−2q−(1−r))-hiding, where γ =
cos2(π/8) ≈ 0.85 (and hence lg(1/γ) ≈ 0.23).
Proof (sketch). We need to argue that there is sufficient min-entropy in θt¯ for
Bob; then, privacy amplification does the job. This means that we have to show
that Bob has small success probability in guessing θt¯. What makes the argument
slightly non-trivial is that Bob can choose t depending on the qubits |0N 〉θ. Note
that since Alice aborts in case |t| > 2qN , we may assume that |t| ≤ 2qN .
It is a straightforward calculation to show that Bob’s success probability in
guessing θ right after step 1 of the protocol, i.e., when given the qubits |0N 〉θ, is
γN , where γ = cos2(π/8) ≈ 0.85. From this it then follows that right after step 2,
Bob’s success probability in guessing θt¯ is at most γN ·22qN : if it was larger, then
he could guess θ right after step 1 with probability larger than γN by simulating
the sampling and guessing the |t| ≤ 2qN bits θi that Alice provides. It follows
that right after step 2, Bob’s min-entropy in θt¯ is N(lg(1/γ) − 2q). Finally, by
the chain rule for min-entropy, Bob’s min-entropy in θt¯ when additionally given
the syndrome s is N
(
lg(1/γ)− 2q)− (n− k) = N(lg(1/γ)− 2q)− n(1− k/n) ≥
N
(
lg(1/γ) − 2q − (1 − r)). The statement then directly follows from privacy
amplification (Theorem 1) and the triangle inequality. ⊓⊔
As for the binding property of our commitment scheme, as we will show, we
achieve a strong notion of security that not only guarantees the existence of a
bit to which Alice is bound in that she cannot reveal the other bit, but this
bit is actually universally extractable from the classical information held by Bob
together with the inputs to the 1CC:
Definition 5 (Universally Extractable). A bit-commitment scheme (in the
1CC-hybrid model) is ǫ-universally extractable if there exists a function c that
acts on the classical information viewBob,1CC held by Bob and 1CC after the
commit phase, so that for any pure commit and open strategy for dishonest Alice,
she has probability at most ǫ of successfully unveiling the bit 1− c(viewBob,1CC).
Our strategy for proving the binding property for our protocol is as follows.
First, we show that due to the checking part, the (joint) state after the commit
phase is of a restricted form. Then, we show that, based on this restriction on
the (joint) state, a non-adaptive Alice who has no access to her quantum state,
cannot open to the “wrong” bit. And finally, we apply our main result to conclude
security against a general (adaptive) Alice.
The following lemma follows immediately from (the adaptive version of)
Bouman and Fehr’s quantum sampling framework [4,9]. Informally, it states that
if Bob did not abort during sampling, then the post-sampling state of Bob’s reg-
ister is close to the correct state, up to a few errors. In other words, after the
commit phase, Bob’s state is a superposition of strings close to 0n in the basis
specified by θt¯.
Lemma 2. Consider an arbitrary pure strategy for Alice in protocol
commit
1CC
N,q,τ,r . Let ρAB be the joint quantum state at the end of the commit
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phase, conditioned (and thus dependent) on t, θ, g, w and s. Then, for any δ > 0,
on average over the choices of t, θ, g, w and s, the state ρAB is ǫ-close to an
“ideal state” ρ˜AB (which is also dependent on t, θ etc.) with the property that the
conditional state of ρ˜AB conditioned on Bob not aborting is pure and of the form
|φAB〉 =
∑
y∈Bδ(0n)
αy|ξy〉A|y〉θt¯ (1)
where |ξy〉 are arbitrary states on Alice’s register and ǫ ≤√4 exp(−q2δ2N/8).
The following lemma implies that after the commit phase, if Alice and Bob
share a state of the form of (1), then a non-adaptive Alice is bound to a fixed
bit which is defined by some string θ′.
Lemma 3. For any t, θ and s there exists θ′ with syndrome s such that for every
θ′′ 6= θ′ with syndrome s, and for every state |φAB〉 of the form of (1),
tr
(
(I⊗ |0〉〈0|θ′′)φAB
) ≤ 2−d2+nh(δ) .
Proof. Let θ′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the string with syndrome s closest to θt¯ (in Hamming
distance). Then, since the set of strings with a fixed syndrome form an error
correcting code of distance d, every other θ′′ ∈ {0, 1}n of syndrome s is at
distance at least d/2 from θt¯. Bob’s reduced density operator of state (1) is
φB =
∑
y,y′∈Bδ(0n) αyα
∗
y′〈ξy′ |ξy〉|y〉〈y′|θt¯ . Using the fact that d(θt¯, θ′′) ≥ d/2 for
every θ′′ 6= θ′ (and hence | tr(|0〉〈0|θ′′ |y〉〈y′|θt¯)| ≤ 2−
d
2 ) and the triangle inequality,
we get:
tr (|0〉〈0|θ′′φB) ≤ 2−
d
2
∑
y,y′∈Bδ(0n)
∣∣αyα∗y′〈ξy′ |ξy〉∣∣
≤ 2− d2
∑
y,y′∈Bδ(0n)
|αy||α∗y′ |
= 2−
d
2
(∑
y
|αy|
)2
≤ 2− d2+nh(δ) ,
where the last inequality is argued by viewing
∑
y |αy| as inner product of the
vectors
∑
y |αy||y〉 and
∑
y |y〉, and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to prove that the scheme is universally extractable:
Theorem 4. For any δ > 0, commit1CCN,q,τ,r is ǫ-universally extractable with
ǫ ≤ 2−N(1−2q)(τ/2−2h(δ)) +
√
4 exp(−q2δ2N/8) .
Proof. We need to show the existence of a binary-valued function c(θ, t, g, w, s)
as required by Definition 5, i.e., such that for any commit strategy, there is no
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opening strategy that allows Alice to unveil c¯, except with small probability. We
define this function as c(t, θ, g, s, w) := g(θ′) ⊕ w where θ′ is as in Lemma 3,
depending on t, θ and s only.
Now, consider an arbitrary pure strategy for Alice in protocol commit1CC.
Let θ, g, w and s be the values chosen by Alice during the commit phase and let
ρAB be the joint state of Alice and Bob after the commit phase. Fix δ > 0 and
consider the states ρ˜AB and |φAB〉 as promised by Lemma 2. Recall that ρAB is ǫ-
close to ρ˜AB (on average over θ, g, w and s, and for ǫ ≤
√
4 exp(−q2δ2N/8)), and
ρ˜AB is a mixture of Bob aborting in the commit phase and of |φAB〉; therefore,
we may assume that Alice and Bob share the pure state φAB = |φAB〉〈φAB |
instead of ρAB by taking into account the probability at most ǫ that the two
states behave differently.
Let B be the set of strings θ′′ with syndrome s such that g(θ′′)⊕ w = c¯ and
let E = {{Eθ′′0 , Eθ
′′
1 }}θ′′∈B be the family of POVMs that correspond to Bob’s
verification measurement when Alice announces θ′′, i.e. where Eθ
′′
1 = |0〉〈0|θ′′
and Eθ
′′
0 = I − |0〉〈0|θ′′ . Then, Alice’s probability of successfully unveiling bit
c¯ equals Psucc(φAB,E) as defined in Sect. 3. In order to apply Corollary 1, we
must first control the size of the side-information that Alice holds. By looking
at the definition of |φAB〉 in (1), we notice that it is a superposition of at most
|Bδ(0n)| ≤ 2nh(δ) terms. Therefore, the rank of φA is at most 2nh(δ) and H0(A) ≤
nh(δ). We can now bound Alice’s probability of opening c¯:
Psucc(φAB ,E) ≤ 2H0(A)Psucc(φB ,E) ≤ 2− d2+2nh(δ) ≤ 2−n(τ/2−2h(δ))
where the first inequality follows from Corollary 1 and Proposition 1, and the
second from the bound on H0(A) and from Lemma 3. ⊓⊔
Regarding the choice of parameters q, τ and r, and the choice of the code,
we note that the Gilbert-Varshamov bound guarantees that the code defined by
a random binary n× (n− rn) generator matrix G has minimal distance d ≥ τn,
except with negligible probability, as long as r < 1 − h(τ). On the other hand,
for the hiding property, we need that r > 1 − 0.23 + 2q. As such, as long as
h(τ) < 0.23− 2q, there exists a suitable rate r and a suitable generator matrix
G, so that our scheme offers statistical security against both parties.
4.4 Universality of 1CC
By using our 1CC-based bit commitment scheme bc1CC in the standard construc-
tion for obtaining OT from BC in the quantum setting [2,7], we can conclude
that 1CC implies OT in the quantum setting, and since OT is universal we thus
immediately obtain the universality of 1CC. However, strictly speaking, this does
not solve the open problem of [9] yet. The caveat is that [9] asks about the uni-
versality of 1CC in the UC security model [20], in other words, whether 1CC is
“universally-composable universal”. So, to truly solve the open problem of [9]
we still need to argue UC security of the resulting OT scheme, for instance by
arguing that our scheme bc1CC is UC secure.
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UC-security of bc1CC against malicious Alice follows immediately from our
binding criterion (Definition 5); after the commit phase, Alice is bound to a bit
that can be extracted in a black-box way from the classical information held
by Bob and the 1CC functionality. Thus, a simulator can extract that bit from
malicious Alice and input it into the ideal commitment functionality, and since
Alice is bound to this bit, this ideal-world attack is indistinguishable from the
real-world attack.
However, it is not clear if bc1CC is UC-secure against malicious Bob. The
problem is that it is unclear whether it is universally equivocable, which is a
stronger notion than the standard hiding property (Definition 4).
Nevertheless, we can still obtain a UC-secure OT scheme in the 1CC-hybrid
model, and so solve the open problem of [9]. For that, we slightly modify the
standard BC-based OT scheme [2,7] with BC instantiated by bc1CC as follows:
for every BB84 qubit that the receiver is meant to measure, he commits to the
basis using bc1CC, but he uses the 1CC-functionality directly to “commit” to the
measurement outcome, i.e., he inputs the measurement outcome into 1CC—and
if the sender asks 1CC to reveal it, the receiver also unveils the accompanying
basis by opening the corresponding commitment.
Definition 5 ensures universal extractability of the committed bases and thus
of the receiver’s input. This implies UC-security against dishonest receiver. In
order to argue UC-security against dishonest sender, we consider a simulator
that acts like the honest receiver, i.e., chooses random bases and commits to
them, but only measures those positions that the sender wants to see—because
the simulator controls the 1CC-functionality he can do that. Then, once he has
learned the sender’s choices for the bases, he can measure all (remaining) qubits
in the correct basis, and thus reconstruct both messages and send them to the
ideal OT functionality. The full details of the proof are in Appendix B.
5 Application 2:
On the Security of bcjl Commitment Scheme
In this section, we show that for a wide class of bit-commitment schemes,
the binding property of the scheme in (a slightly strengthened version of) the
bounded-quantum-storage model reduces to its binding property against a dis-
honest committer that has no quantum memory at all. We then demonstrate
the usefulness of this on the example of the bcjl commitment scheme [6].
5.1 Setting Up the Stage
The class of schemes to which our reduction applies consists of the schemes that
are non-interactive: all communication goes from Alice, the committer, to Bob,
the verifier. Furthermore, we require that Bob’s verification be “projective” in
the following sense.
Definition 6. We say that a bit-commitment scheme is non-interactive and
with projective verification, if it is of the following form.
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Commit: Alice sends a classical message x and a quantum register B to Bob.
Opening to b: Alice sends a classical opening yb to Bob, and Bob applies a
binary-outcome projective measurement {Vx,yb , I− Vx,yb} to register B.
Since x is fixed after the commit phase, we tend to leave the dependency of Vx,yb
from x implicit and write Vyb instead. Also, to keep language simple, we will
just speak of a non-interactive bit-commitment scheme and drop the projective
verification part in the terminology.
We consider the security—more precisely: the binding property—of such
bit-commitment schemes in a slightly strengthened version of the bounded-
quantum-storage model [8], where we bound the quantum memory of Alice,
but we also restrict her measurement (for producing yb in the opening phase)
to be projective. This restriction on Alice’s measurement is well justified since a
general non-projective measurement requires additional quantum storage in the
form of an ancilla to be performed coherently. From a technical perspective, this
restriction (as well as the restriction on Bob’s verification) is a byproduct of our
proof technique, which requires the measurement operator describing the (joint)
opening procedure to be repeatable; avoiding it is an open question.7
Formally, we capture the binding property as follows in this variation of the
bounded-quantum-storage model.
Definition 7 (Binding). A non-interactive bit commitment scheme is called
ǫ-binding against q-quantum-memory-bounded (or q-QMB for short) projective
adversaries if, for all states ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) with dim(HA) ≤ 2q and for all
classical messages x,
PA0 (ρAB) + P
A
1 (ρAB) ≤ 1 + ǫ
where
PAb (ρAB) := max{Fyb}yb
∑
yb
tr ((Fyb ⊗ Vx,yb)ρAB)
is the probability of successfully opening bit b, maximized over all projective
measurements {Fyb}yb .
In case q = 0, where the above requirement reduces to
PNA0 (ρAB) + P
NA
1 (ρAB) ≤ 1 + ǫ with PNAb (ρAB) := maxyb tr (Vx,ybρB)
and ρB = trA(ρAB), we also speak of ǫ-binding against non-adaptive adversaries.
On the binding criterion for non-interactive commitment schemes
Binding criteria analogous to the one specified in Definition 7 have tradition-
ally been weak notions of security against dishonest committers for quantum
commitment schemes, as opposed to criteria that are more in the spirit of a
7 The standard technique (using Naimark’s dilation theorem) does not work here.
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bit that cannot be opened by the adversary. While more convenient for proving
security of commitment schemes, a notable flaw of the p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ǫ defini-
tion is that it does not rule out the following situation. An adversary might,
by some complex measurement, either completely ruin its capacity to open the
commitment, or be able to open the bit of its choice. Then the total probability
of opening 0 and 1 sum to 1, but, conditioned on the second outcome of this
measurement, they sum to 2. This is obviously an undesirable property of a
quantum bit-commitment scheme.
Non-interactive schemes that are secure according to Definition 7 are binding
in a stronger sense. For instance, the above problem of the p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ǫ
definition does not hold for non-interactive schemes. If a scheme is ǫ-binding,
then any state ρ obtained by conditioning on some measurement outcome must
satisfy PA0 (ρ) + P
A
1 (ρ) ≤ 1 + ǫ. If the total probability of opening 0 and 1 was
any higher, then the adversary could have prepared the state ρ in the first place,
contradicting the fact that the protocol is ǫ-binding. It remains an open question
how to accurately describe the security of non-interactive commitment schemes
that satisfy Definition 7.
5.2 The General Reduction
We want to reduce security against a q-QMB projective adversary to the secu-
rity against a non-adaptive adversary (which should be much easier to show)
by means of applying our general adaptive-to-non-adaptive reduction. However,
Corollary 1 does not apply directly; we need some additional gadget, which is in
the form of the following lemma. It establishes that if there is a commit strategy
for Alice so that the cumulative probability of opening 0 and 1 exceeds 1 by a
non-negligible amount, then there is also a commit strategy for her so that she
can open 0 with certainty and 1 with still a non-negligible probability.
Lemma 4. Let ρ ∈ D(HA⊗HB) and ǫ > 0 be such that PA0 (ρ)+PA1 (ρ) ≥ 1+ ǫ.
Then, there exists ρ0 ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) such that PA0 (ρ0) = 1 and PA1 (ρ0) ≥ ǫ2.
Proof. Let {Fy0}y0 and {Gy1}y1 be the projective measurements maximizing
PA0 (ρ) and P
A
1 (ρ), respectively. Define the projections onto the 0/1-accepting
subspaces as
P0 :=
∑
y0
Fy0 ⊗ Vy0 and P1 :=
∑
y1
Gy1 ⊗ Vy1 .
Since tr((P0+P1)ρ) = PA0 (ρ)+P
A
1 (ρ) ≥ 1+ǫ, it follows that ‖P0+P1‖ ≥ 1+ǫ.
From Lemma 1, we have that
1 + ‖P1P0‖ ≥ ‖P0 + P1‖ ≥ 1 + ǫ .
Therefore there exists |φ〉 such that ‖P1P0|φ〉‖ ≥ ǫ. Define |φ0〉 := P0|φ〉/‖P0|φ〉‖,
which we claim has the required properties. The probability to open 0 from |φ0〉
is ‖P0|φ0〉‖2 = 1, and the probability to open 1 from |φ0〉 is ‖P1P0|φ0〉‖2 =
‖P1P0|φ〉‖2/‖P0|φ〉‖2 ≥ ǫ2. ⊓⊔
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Now, we are ready to state and prove the general reduction.
Theorem 5. If a non-interactive bit-commitment scheme is ǫ-binding against
non-adaptive adversaries, then it is (2
1
2
q√ǫ)-binding against q-QMB projective
adversaries.
Proof. Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB) be the joint state of Alice and Bob where
dim(HA) ≤ 2q and let α > 0 be such that the opening probabilities satisfy
PA0 (ρ) + P
A
1 (ρ) = 1 + α. From Lemma 4, we know that there exists ρ
0
AB ∈
D(HA ⊗HB) constructed from ρ such that
PA0 (ρ
0) = 1 and PA1 (ρ
0) ≥ α2 .
We use Corollary 1 and the assumption that the protocol is ǫ-binding against
non-adaptive adversaries to show that α cannot be too large. Let {Fy0}y0 be
the measurement that maximizes PA0 (ρ
0). Let us consider Bob’s reduced density
operator of ρ0:
ρ0B = trA
(
ρ0AB
)
=
∑
y0
trA
(
(Fy0 ⊗ I)ρ0AB
)
=
∑
y0
λy0σy0
where for each y0, it holds that tr(Vy0σy0) = 1. This implies tr(Vy1σy0) ≤ ǫ for
every y1 that opens 1 from our assumption of the non-adaptive security of the
commitment scheme. Then
PNA1 (ρ
0
AB) = maxy1
tr
(
Vy1ρ
0
B
)
= max
y1
∑
y0
λy0 tr (Vy1σy0) ≤ ǫ .
Applying Corollary 1 completes the proof:
α2 ≤ PA1 (ρ0) ≤ 2I
acc
max
(B;A)ρ0PNA1 (ρ
0) ≤ 2H0(A)ρ0 ǫ ≤ 2qǫ .
⊓⊔
5.3 Special Case: the bcjl Bit-Commitment Scheme
In this subsection, we use the results of the previous section to prove the security
of the bcjl scheme in the bounded storage model against projective measure-
ment attacks.
The bcjl bit-commitment scheme was proposed in 1993 by Brassard, Cré-
peau, Jozsa, and Langlois [6]. They proposed to hide the committed bit using
a two-universal family of hash functions applied on the codeword of an error
correcting code and then send this codeword through BB84 qubits. The idea
behind this protocol is that privacy amplification hides the committed bit while
the error correcting code makes it hard to change the value of this bit without
being detected. While their intuition was correct, their proof ultimately was not,
as shown by Mayers’ impossibility result for bit commitment [18].
The following scheme differs only slightly from the original [6], this allows us
to recycle some of the analysis from Sect. 4.
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commit(b):
1. Let C be a linear [n, k, d]-error correcting code with k > 0.78n.
2. Alice chooses a random string x ∈R {0, 1}
n and a random basis θ ∈R {+,×}
n.
She sends |x〉
θ
to Bob.
3. Upon reception of the qubits, Bob chooses a random basis θˆ and measures the
qubits in basis θˆ. Let xˆ denote his measurement result.
4. Let Gn be a family of two-universal hash functions. Alice chooses g ∈R Gn and
computes the syndrome s of x for the linear code C. She sends w = g(x)⊕ b,
g and s to Bob.
reveal:
1. Alice sends x, θ and b to Bob.
2. Bob checks that x has syndrome s. He then checks that xˆi = xi for every i
such that θˆi = θi. He accepts if g(x) ⊕ w = b and none of the above tests
failed.
Fig. 3. The bcjl bit-commitment scheme
Theorem 6. bcjl is statistically hiding as long as 0.22− (1− k/n) ∈ Ω(1).
The proof of Theorem 6 is straightforward. It follows the same approach as that
of Theorem 3 by noticing that Bob has the same uncertainty about each xi as
he had about θi in protocol commit1CC.
Instead of proving that bcjl is binding, we prove that an equivalent scheme
bcjlδ (see Fig. 4) is binding. The bcjlδ scheme is a modified version of bcjl
in which Bob has unlimited quantum memory and stores the qubits sent by
Alice during the commit phase instead of measuring them. The opening phase
of bcjlδ is characterized by a parameter δ which determines how close it is to
the opening phase of bcjl. The following lemma shows that the two protocols
are equivalent from Alice’s point of view; if Alice can cheat an honest Bob then
she can cheat a Bob with unbounded quantum computing capabilities.
Lemma 5. Let δ > 0. If bcjlδ is ǫ-binding then bcjl is (ǫ+2 · 2−δn)-binding.
Proof. Let (x, θ) be an opening to 0. First notice that Bob’s actions in bcjl
are equivalent to holding onto his state until the opening procedure, measuring
in basis θ and verifying xT = xˆT for a randomly chosen sample T ⊆ [n]. From
this point of view, Bob’s measurement result is identically distributed in both
protocols and we can speak of xˆ without ambiguity. If d(x, xˆ) > δn, then the
probability that xi = xˆi for all i ∈ T is at most 2−δn. Therefore, if Bob rejects
in revealδ with measurement outcome xˆ, then the probability that he rejects
in reveal with the same outcome is at least 1− 2−δn. If we let p0 denote Bob’s
19
commitδ(b):
1. Let C be a linear [n, k, d]-error correcting code with k > 0.78n.
2. Alice chooses a random string x ∈R {0, 1}
n and a random basis θ ∈R {+,×}
n.
She sends |x〉
θ
to Bob.
3. Bob stores all the qubits he received to measure them later.
4. Let Gn be a family of two-universal hash functions. Alice chooses g ∈R Gn and
computes the syndrome s of x for the linear code C. She sends w = g(x)⊕ b,
g and s to Bob.
revealδ :
1. Alice sends x, θ and b to Bob.
2. Bob checks that x has syndrome s. He then measures his stored qubits in basis
θ to obtain xˆ. He accepts if d(x, xˆ) ≤ δn and g(x) ⊕ w = b and none of the
above tests failed.
Fig. 4. The bcjlδ bit-commitment scheme.
accepting probability in the original protocol and pδ0 in the modified protocol,
we have p0 ≤ pδ0 + 2−δn. Since the same holds for openings to 1, we have
p0 + p1 ≤ pδ0 + pδ1 + 2 · 2−δn ≤ 1 + ǫ+ 2 · 2−δn .
⊓⊔
The following proposition establishes the security of bcjlδ in the non-adaptive
setting. Its proof is straightforward and can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 4. bcjlδ is 2
−d/2+δn+h(δ)n-binding against non-adaptive adver-
saries.
Since the bit-commitment scheme bcjlδ is non-interactive, it directly follows
from Theorem 5 and Proposition 4 that bcjlδ is 2
1
2
(q−d/2+δn+h(δ)n)-binding
against q-QMB projective adversaries. Combining the above with Lemma 5, we
have the following statement for the bcjl scheme.
Theorem 7. The bcjl bit-commitment scheme is (2
1
2
(q−d/2+δn+h(δ)n)+2·2−δn)-
binding against q-QMB projective adversaries.
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A Additional proofs
Proposition 2 For any state ρZAB with classical Z:
Iaccmax(B;A|Z)ρ ≤ maxz I
acc
max(B;A)ρz ≤ H0(A)ρ .
Proof. By assumption, ρZAB is of the form ρZAB =
∑
z PZ(z)|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzAB. Let
MZA→X be a measurement on Z and A. By linearity, and by definition of Iaccmax,
we have that
M(ρZAB) =
∑
z
PZ(z)M
(|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzAB)
≤
∑
z
PZ(z) · 2Iaccmax(B;A|Z)|z〉〈z|⊗ρzN z
(|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzB)
for suitably chosen measurementsN zZ→X . Now, noting that Iaccmax(B;A|Z)|z〉〈z|⊗ρz =
Iaccmax(B;A)ρz , and that there exists a fixed measurement NZ→X so that
N z(|z〉〈z|) = N (|z〉〈z|) for all z, it follows that
M(ρZAB) ≤ 2maxz Iaccmax(B;A)ρzN (ρZB) ,
which implies the first claimed inequality. The second inequality follows imme-
diately by observing that Iaccmax(B;A)ρz ≤ H0(A)ρz ≤ H0(A)ρ. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 Let EAB→A′B′ be a CPTP map of the form E = EA⊗EB. Then
Iaccmax(B
′;A′)E(ρ) ≤ Iaccmax(B;A)ρ .
Proof. Since the CPTP map EB commutes with any measurement applied on
Alice’s register, it cannot increase the maximal accessible information.
To show that the CPTP map EA cannot increase Iaccmax, it suffices to show
that for every measurement M on register A, the CPTP map M ◦ EA is also
a measurement. Let {Ek}k be the Kraus operators associated with EA and let
{Fx}x be the POVM operators describing the measurement M. Then, the pos-
itive operators F ′x :=
∑
k E
†
kFxEk describe a POVM M′, and
M◦ EA(ρ) =M′(ρ) ≤ 2Iaccmax(B;A)ρσX ⊗ ρB
by the definition of Iaccmax(B;A)ρ for some normalized σX . ⊓⊔
Proposition 4 Protocol bcjlδ is 2
−d/2+δn+h(δ)n-binding against non-adaptive
adversaries.
Proof. Let ρAB ∈ D(HA⊗HB) be the joint state of Alice and Bob and let Vδx,θ :=∑
z∈Bδ(x) |z〉〈z|θ be the projective measurement corresponding to Bob’s verifica-
tion procedure in protocol bcjlδ if Alice announced (x, θ). Using Lemma 1, we
have that for any two distinct openings (x, θ) and (x′, θ′),
tr
(
V
δ
x,θρB
)
+ tr
(
V
δ
x′,θ′ρB
)
= tr
(
(Vδx,θ + V
δ
x′,θ′)ρB
)
≤ ||Vδx,θ + Vδx′,θ′ ||
≤ 1 + ||Vδx,θVδx′,θ′|| .
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Using techniques from [5], we can show that
||Vδx,θVδx′,θ′|| ≤ max
z∈Bδ(x)
z′∈Bδ(x′)
|〈z|θ|z′〉θ′ |
√
|Bδ(x)||Bδ(x′)| .
Using the fact that d(z, z′) ≥ d− 2δn for z ∈ Bδ(x) and z′ ∈ Bδ(x′) for any two
strings x and x′ with the same syndrome, and the fact that |Bδ(x)| ≤ 2h(δ)n, it
follows that when maximizing over openings to 0 and 1, we obtain
PNA0 (ρAB) + P
NA
1 (ρAB) ≤ 1 + 2−d/2+δn+h(δ)n .
⊓⊔
B UC-Completeness of 1CC
B.1 The UC Model
In order to show that a scheme securely implements a given functionality F in
the universally composable (UC) model, one has to show that for any adversary
that attacks the scheme by corrupting participants, there exists a simulator S
that instead attacks the functionality, but is indistinguishable from the adversary
from an outside observer’s perspective. More precisely, one considers an environ-
ment Z that interacts with the adversary in the real model where the scheme is
executed, or with S in the ideal model where the functionality F is executed, and
it provides input to and obtains output from the uncorrupt players (see Fig. 5).
The scheme is said to statistically quantum-UC-emulate the functionality if the
environment cannot distinguish the real from the ideal model with non-negligible
probability. For a more detailed description of the quantum UC framework, we
refer to [9,20].
A B Z
1CC
committed
(open,b)
S BC Z
(commit,b)
open
committed
(open,b)
Fig. 5. The real model (top) and the ideal model (bottom) for protocol bc1CC and
functionality BC, respectively, with a dishonest Alice. bc1CC statistically quantum-UC-
emulates BC (against dishonest Alice) if the two models are indistinguishable for Z.
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Most UC security proofs follow a similar mold. S internally runs a copy of
the adversary, and it simulates the actions and interactions of the honest party,
and of functionalities that are possibly used as subroutines in the scheme. S
must look like the real model adversary to the environment Z, so it forwards
any message it receives from Z to (its internal execution of) the adversary and
vice versa. Furthermore, from the interaction with the adversary, it extracts the
input(s) it has to provide to F (see Fig. 6).
A B
1CC
BC Z
S
(commit, b)
open
committed
(open,b)
Fig. 6. The standard way for constructing S : run dishonest Alice internally and simu-
late honest Bob and the calls to the functionality 1CC, and extract the input to BC.
In all our proofs below, the honest party is simulated by S by running it hon-
estly, up to possible small modifications that are unnoticeable to the adversary,
and that do not affect the (simulated) honest party’s output. As such, in our
proofs below, for showing indistinguishability of the real and the ideal model, it
is sufficient to argue that, in the ideal model, the output of the simulated honest
party equals what F outputs to Z upon the input that is provided by S.
B.2 UC Security of OT from 1CC
As explained in Section 4.4, our protocol bc1CC does not seem to satisfy the
UC security definition in case of a corrupted verifier Bob. As such, we cannot
conclude UC security of the standard BC-based OT scheme [2,7] with BC instan-
tiated by bc1CC. Instead, we show UC security of OT from 1CC by means of the
following strategy.
First, we show UC security of bc1CC against a corrupted committer Alice
(Proposition 5). Then, we show that BC and 1CC together imply 2CC (actually,
a variation of 2CC that gives Alice the option to abort) by means of a straight-
forward protocol (Proposition 6), and we recall that 2CC implies OT by means
of the protocol ot2CC from [9]. Instantiating the underlying functionality BC
by bc1CC then gives us a protocol ot1CC with UC security against a corrupted
receiver (Lemma 6). Finally, it is rather straightforward to prove UC security of
ot
1CC against a corrupted sender directly (Lemma 7).
Proposition 5. Protocol bc1CC statistically quantum-UC-emulates BC against
corrupted committer Alice.
Proof. The construction of S follows the paradigm outlined above. S runs dis-
honest Alice internally, and it simulates honest Bob and 1CC by running them
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honestly. Note that S gets to see Alice’s inputs to 1CC. Once Alice announces
g, w and s at the end of the commit phase, S computes b = g(θ′) ⊕ w, where
θ′ is the string of syndrome s closest to the stored θt, and inputs “(commit, b)”
into the BC functionality. Finally, when corrupted Alice opens her commitment,
S inputs “open” into BC if Bob accepted the opening, and inputs “abort” if Bob
aborted.
It now follows immediately from Lemma 3 that the bit b′ output by the simu-
lated Bob equals the bit b computed by S and input to BC, except with negligible
probability. As such, real and ideal model are statistically indistinguishable. ⊓⊔
Parties: The sender Alice and the receiver Bob.
Inputs: Alice receives s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob receives c ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Alice inputs “(commit, s0)” in BC, Bob receives “committed”.
2. Alice and Bob invoke 1CC with respective inputs s1 and c.
3. If Alice receives c = 1 from 1CC, she sends “open” to BC. Bob receives s0 from
1CC and s1 from BC.
4. Alice outputs c, Bob outputs (s0, s1) if c = 1 and ⊥ if c = 0. Bob outputs
“abort” if c = 1 but Alice refuses to open her commitment.
Fig. 7. Protocol 2ccBC,1CC.
Consider the candidate 2-bit cut-and-choose protocol 2ccBC,1CC from Fig. 7.
This protocol does not implement the full-fledged 2CC functionality, but a vari-
ation 2CC′ that gives the sender the option to abort after it sees the receiver’s
input c. This is because in the protocol the sender can refuse to open its com-
mitments (or try to cheat when opening them so that the receiver will reject).
In that case, the receiver will only learn one of the receiver’s two inputs. This
will not influence the security of the resulting OT scheme since aborting in any
instance of 2CC′ will stop the protocol.
Formally, 2CC′ is described as follows: it first waits for inputs (s0, s1) from
Alice and c from Bob. Upon reception of both inputs, it sends c to Alice. If c = 0,
it sends ⊥ to Bob. If c = 1, it waits for response “abort” or “continue” from Alice.
On input “continue”, 2CC′ outputs (s0, s1) to Bob and on input “abort”, it outputs
“abort”.
Proposition 6. Protocol 2ccBC,1CC statistically quantum-UC-emulates 2CC′.
Proof. We first consider a corrupted sender Alice. S simulates Bob, BC and 1CC
by running them honestly. After step 2, when S has learned Alice’s respective
inputs s0 and s1 to BC and 1CC, it inputs (s0, s1) into the functionality 2CC′.
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After receiving c from the 2CC′, S makes Bob input c into the 1CC. If c = 0
then the simulated Bob and 2CC′ both output ⊥. If c = 1 then Alice is supposed
to open her commitment. If she refuses then S inputs “abort” into 2CC′, and
the simulated Bob and 2CC′ both output “abort”. Otherwise, i.e., if Alice opens
the commitment (to s0), S inputs “continue”, and the simulated Bob and 2CC′
both output (s0, s1). This proves the claim for a corrupted sender Alice. Security
against a corrupted receiver Bob is similarly straightforward. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2. Protocol 2cc1CC, obtained by replacing each instance of BC by
bc
1CC, statistically quantum-UC-emulates 2CC′ against corrupted sender.
Proof. Since bc1CC statistically quantum UC-emulates BC against malicious
committer, and since the sender in 2ccBC,1CC is the committer of BC, we can
replace BC with bc1CC in protocol 2ccBC,1CC and still maintain UC-security
against corrupted sender. ⊓⊔
Parameters: A family F = {{0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ} of universal hash functions.
Parties: The sender Alice and the receiver Bob.
Inputs: Alice receives s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}
ℓ and Bob receives c ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Alice chooses xA ∈R {0, 1}
n and θA ∈R {+,×}
n and sends the state |xA〉
θA
to Bob.
2. Upon reception, Bob chooses θB ∈R {+,×}
n and measures the received state
in basis θB . Lets xB denote the measurement outcome.
3. For i = 1 . . . n, do
(a) Alice and Bob perform protocol commit1CC with Bob as the sender and
input θBi .
(b) Alice chooses a selection bit ti ∈R {0, 1} and they invoke an instance of
1CC with Bob as the sender and inputs ti and x
B
i .
(c) Whenever ti = 1, Bob opens the ith commitment using protocol
reveal1CC.
4. If for some i s.t. ti = 1, θ
A
i = θ
B
i , but x
B
i 6= x
A
i , Alice aborts. Bob aborts
if ti = 1 for more than 3n/5 positions. Let xˆ
A (resp. θˆA, xˆB, θˆB) be the
restriction of xA (resp. θA, xB, θB) to the indices i for which ti = 0.
5. Alice sends θˆA to Bob. Bob constructs sets Ic = {i | θˆ
A
i = θˆ
B
i } and I1−c = {i |
θˆAi 6= θˆ
B
i } then sends (I0, I1) to Alice.
6. Alice chooses f ∈R F , computes mi = si ⊕ f(xˆ
A
Ii
) for i = 0, 1 and sends
(f,m0,m1) to Bob.
7. Bob outputs s = mc ⊕ f(xˆ
B
Ic
).
Fig. 8. Protocol ot1CC.
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Lemma 6. Protocol ot1CC statistically quantum UC-emulates OT for corrupted
receiver.
Proof. Note that steps 3a through 3c of protocol ot1CC are identical to protocol
2cc
1CC defined above with Bob as the sender and Alice as the receiver. Since
2cc
1CC statistically quantum-UC-emulates 2CC′ against corrupted sender, we
may replace steps 3a-3c by a single call to 2CC′ with Bob as the sender and
Alice as the receiver, and analyze the security of this protocol instead. The only
difference between this protocol and the 2CC-based oblivious-transfer protocol
from [9] is that the former uses 2CC′ instead. However, this change does not
affect UC-security since any adversary that aborts during one of the 2cc1CC
subroutines is indistinguishable from an adversary that aborts right after the
same subroutine. It directly follows from the analysis of [9], that protocol ot1CC
statistically quantum-UC-emulates OT against corrupted receiver. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Protocol ot1CC statistically quantum UC-emulates OT for corrupted
sender.
Proof. Let Alice be the corrupted sender and Bob the honest receiver. S simu-
lates Bob and 1CC by running them honestly, except that Bob does not measure
the received state in step 2 but stores it, and in step 3b, whenever Alice inputs
ti = 1 into 1CC, S “rushes” and measures the ith qubit in basis θBi and inputs
the outcome xBi in the 1CC. Furthermore, in step 5, S replies to Alice with a
random partition (I0, I1). At the end of the protocol, S measures the remaining
qubits in Alice’s basis θˆA to obtain xˆB, computes si = mi ⊕ f(xˆBIi) for i = 0, 1,
and sends (s0, s1) to the ideal OT functionality.
The output of OT, i.e., sc, coincides with the string that a fully honest Bob
would have output; hence, we have indistinguishability between the real and the
ideal model. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. 1CC is statistically quantum UC-complete.
Proof. We have shown that ot1CC statistically quantum-UC-emulates OT. Since
OT is quantum-UC-complete, we conclude that 1CC is also quantum-UC-complete.
⊓⊔
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